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ABSTRACT 
The old common strategies instrument was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in order 
to improve the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action. However, shortly after its 
introduction the instrument suffered an inglorious demise because it failed to provide any 
added value. It is therefore surprising that the Lisbon Treaty, rather unnoticed, holds on to 
this instrument in Article 22 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Yet, rather than a relic 
of the past, this move represents a deliberate endeavor to tackle the shortcomings of its 
predecessor. Despite its significant potential in the new external action constellation, Article 
22 TEU has however not yet been used in practice, suggesting that its innovative 
constitutional design did in fact not reply to any pressing political needs. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Article 22TEU empowers the European Council to adopt decisions on the strategic interests 
and objectives of the Union. These decisions are designed to set out a comprehensive EU 
approach aimed at improving the coherence and effectiveness of policies in the areas they 
address. Once such a European Council decision has been agreed, it enables the adoption 
of implementing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions by qualified majority 
voting (QMV), instead of the general rule of unanimity in this policy field.  
Whilst not explicitly stated, this design irrefutably recycles the concept of the old common 
strategies, a CFSP instrument introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam.1 Eventually, only 
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three such strategies were adopted (on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region) and 
the instrument soon fell into disuse for failing to impact on the development and 
implementation of concrete EU policies. This resulted from a number of in-build flaws that 
made its purpose of comprehensiveness conflict with the EU’s constitutional structure that 
firmly encapsulated the various external action strands in three separate pillars. 
Article 22 TEU addresses the main shortcomings of its predecessor and provides a more 
solid constitutional basis for all-encompassing EU action. Whereas this redesign suggests 
that the Treaty drafters saw a future for this instrument in the new external action 
constellation, not a single European Council decision of this kind has yet been adopted. This 
curious resurrection, that has gone largely unnoticed in scholarly debate, raises questions 
with regard to the potential of this instrument in the new constitutional, procedural and 
institutional architecture of the Lisbon Treaty. In order to better grasp its added value and 
understand why the new instrument holds greater potential, it is necessary to first take a few 
steps back and analyse the reasons behind the failure of its predecessor.  
2. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COMMON STRATEGIES: CHRONICLE OF A 
DEATH FORETOLD 
In language that noticeably reminds of the more recent Laeken Declaration, 2  the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) completed in Amsterdam was to ensure that the 
Union’s ‘external action is coherent and effective in all its aspects, and it must improve its 
decision-making procedures, if it is to play a role in the world commensurate with its 
responsibilities and its potential’.3One of the main endeavours to fulfil these objectives was 
ex Article 13 (now as amended Article 26) TEU that called the common strategies into being: 
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the 
Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made 
available by the Union and the Member States. 
3. … The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and 
shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions. 
By empowering the European Council these provisions ensured strategic guidance over EU 
external action from the highest institutional level. The adoption of a CS moreover opened 
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the possibility to derogate from the general CFSP rule of unanimity in the Council and 
allowed to vote by qualified majority on joint actions and common positions taken on its 
basis.4 
With this innovative design the CSs clearly aimed to strengthen strategic leadership, 
enhance its coherence and streamline voting procedures.5 In this manner they replied to a 
number of important foreign policy preoccupations within the EU and therefore seemed to be 
accorded a promising future.6 Nonetheless this experiment was short-lived, which can be 
explained by a number of in-built flaws (2.1.) resulting in substantive deficiencies of the 
adopted strategies (2.2.).  
2.1. STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES 
Rather than stemming from a willingness to develop a truly strategic instrument, the creation 
of the common strategies represented a political compromise between those Member States 
keen to introduce QMV and those sticking to unanimity in the sensitive area of CFSP.7The 
provision that joint actions and common positions taken on its basis shall be adopted by 
QMV was part of a deal set out in ex Article 23(2) (now as amended Article 31(2)) TEU. This 
article lists the exceptions to the general rule of unanimity that were acceptable to all 
Member States.8This concealed motivation for creating a strategic instrument resulted in two 
main structural deficiencies.  
First, a closer reading indicates that this compromise formula was in fact unbalanced or even 
unreal. Member States that feared to be outvoted in implementing decisions were provided 
with two important opportunities to step on the brake. In the first place, CSs were adopted by 
the European Council taking decisions by consensus.9In order to avoid giving a safe-conduct 
for subsequent decisions in the Council, every Member State could thus strive to 
circumscribe the mandate in areas it considered sensitive.10In other words, Member States 
could simply ensure that the bulk of decision-making moved up in the institutional hierarchy 
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to the level of the European Council.11Second, also the implementation of this potentially 
thorough bargain could be blocked by any Member State in the Council on the basis of the 
escape clause included in ex Article 23(2) (now as amended Article 31(2)) TEU:  
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a 
vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the 
matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity. 
This provision, reminiscent of the unfortunate Luxembourg compromise, granted every 
Member State able to demonstrate important reasons of national policy – the meaning of 
which was left to the individual discretion of the opposing State – the power to block a vote 
by QMV.12Finally, the QMV possibility did not apply to decisions having military or defence 
implications.13 These restraining conditions regarding the adoption and implementation of 
CSs represented a kind of in-built fear for QMV with a potentially paralysing effect. 
A second consequence of this focus on procedural issues was that significantly less attention 
went to the substance of the instrument.14This arises clearly from the short and vague Treaty 
language of ex Article 13 TEU. Especially the provision that the Council shall implement the 
CSs ‘in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions’ raised many questions as 
to what constituted the other ‘means to be made available’.15Given the European Council's 
mandate to provide the necessary impetus for the whole of the EU,16 the common strategies 
could be expected to have a comprehensive scope. This would imply that they could touch 
upon the external aspects of the Community pillar (such as trade, fisheries and 
environmental policy) as well as aspects of the two intergovernmental pillars of the CFSP 
and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM, tackling for instance 
terrorism, organised crime, etc.) Yet, common strategies were de jure strictly CFSP 
instruments and therefore many authors initially did not interpret Article 13 TEU as a basis for 
cross-pillar action.17 
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It was the General Affairs Council of December 1998 that first set the CSs on a cross-pillar 
path by stating that they should make ‘full use of all the means and instruments available to 
it’ and be in conformity with then Article M (ex Article 47, now as amended Article 40) TEU.18 
This was the main article defining the relationship between the three pillars. It stated that 
nothing in the TEU 'shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities'. This 
was interpreted by the EU Court of Justice as a 'hierarchical delimitation rule',19 implying 
watertight pillar walls combined with the subordination of CFSP and PJCC measures that 
were prohibited from 'encroaching' on EC competences.20 
The first CS on Russia subsequently took away all doubt with its all-encompassing focus 
including elements of economic and social policy, stability and security as well as justice and 
home affairs.21 In an annexed declaration it was moreover specified that the Council acts by 
QMV when adopting CFSP measures on the basis of this strategy, whereas other acts 
continued to be adopted according to the decision-making procedures provided by the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties. In one strike this was as a formal recognition of its cross-
pillar character, as well as a reminder that the despite the comprehensive nature of the 
common strategies the EU ‘reste prisonnière de ses competences cloisonnées’.22 
From a practical perspective this comprehensive scope was conducive to the coherence and 
effectiveness of EU external action. Moreover, it was not illogical that an instrument under 
the auspices of the CFSP, as the main political arm of EU foreign policy, took on the task of 
providing direction to the whole of Union activities towards a certain country or region. From 
a legal point of view, however, such a cross-pillar approach was considerably more 
problematic.23A CFSP instrument that provides direction to – let alone imposes obligations on 
– EC policies risked to be at cross-purposes with the explicit hierarchy laid down in the 
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Treaties.24 In the light of ex Article 47 TEU, that prohibited the TEU from affecting the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC), this was moreover subject to judicial review. 
This constitutional anomaly was to a certain extent compensated on an institutional level. 
Without having a formal role in the mainly intergovernmental CFSP decision-making, the 
Commission – as guardian of the EC acquis communautaire – was nevertheless fully 
associated with the work carried out and had its President participating in European Council 
meetings.25However, these provisions were not able to prevent the resurgence of concerns 
about the intergovernmental contamination of the EC.26The preparatory work on the first CS 
immediately led to the Commission voicing its opposition against potential legal obligations 
imposed upon it27 and the European Parliament lamenting its lack of involvement.28 
2.1.1. SUBSTANTIVE DEFICIENCIES 
Between June 1999 and June 2000 the European Council adopted three common strategies 
on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region.29 In view of their open-ended Treaty 
mandate, the first served as a kind of prototype that was taken over in the subsequent 
strategies30 with a gradually optimised structure and improved wording.31These CSs were 
interesting documents that gave a good overview of existing policies and enumerated 
unanimously agreed positions and objectives. However, as a result of the structural defects 
in their conceptual design set out above, the adopted texts were at the same time too 
detailed and too vague to function as genuine EU strategies towards the targeted countries 
and region. 
First, their remarkable degree of detail resulted from the above-discussed design of the QMV 
exception that turned out to have a restraining rather than a facilitating effect. The European 
Council's Treaty mandate for setting out the objectives, duration and means was exploited to 
the fullest in order to adopt detailed documents that contained ‘more specific provisions, in 
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lengthier texts, than the “common positions” hitherto adopted by the Council’.32The fear for 
QMV – that was explicitly recognised by the UK House of Lords in the context of the CS on 
the Mediterranean and its provisions on the Middle East Peace Process33 – resulted in long 
lists of objectives supplemented with even more detailed enumerations of specific initiatives. 
For instance, in the particular field of money laundering, the CS on Russia stated that it shall 
cooperate with the latter by drawing up a common plan for its effective prosecution and 
organising seminars on the existing types and methods. Such meticulous prescriptions could 
function as a blockade for any initiative that would go beyond them and thus unequivocally 
circumscribed the range of policy choices left for the implementation in the 
Council.34Conversely, the most sensitive topics, such as the issue of enlargement in the case 
of Ukraine and the Chechnya crisis in the CS on Russia, were left entirely untouched. This 
silence ensured that if a decision were to be taken on these subjects, any Member State 
could argue that this did not constitute an implementing measure in the sense of ex Article 
23(2) TEU, meaning that a vote would still have to be taken by unanimity.  
Second, with regard to the modalities of implementation the CSs then again remained 
remarkably vague. On the one hand, all three documents ambitiously stated that the EU will 
achieve the cited objectives by ‘making appropriate use of all relevant instruments and 
means available to the Union, the Community and to the Member States’.35Moreover, flirting 
with a breach of ex Article 47 TEU, the Council, the Member States and the Commission 
were called upon to review and adjust their existing actions, programmes, instruments and 
policies in consistency with the CS. However, when turning to the operationalisation of this 
strong language, the strategies were considerably more timid.36They did not set out any 
division of labour, attached specific financial means or imposed concrete obligations on the 
EU institutions or the Member States beyond ‘examining’ possibilities, ‘considering’ means or 
‘preparing’ reports. 
This vagueness can be explained by their constitutionally questionable cross-pillar nature. 
The adopted strategies clearly sought to strike a balance between improving the coherence 
of EU external action and respecting the integrity of the EC legal order.37While all three 
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documents included provisions that could require the Commission to initiate implementing 
action, obligations were formulated in an open-ended fashion so as to allow sufficient 
leeway. The downside hereof was a lack of institutional transparency that diffused policy 
responsibility and did not provide any clarity as to the choice of legal basis for implementing 
measures.38 The task of planning, reviewing and evaluating this implementation was left to 
the six-monthly presidencies. Because the latter were not provided with specific guidelines, 
work plans were drawn up in an ad hoc fashion that soon became more of a ritual than a 
thorough strategic exercise.39 
The lack of transparency provided even more reason for concern regarding the CSs overlap 
with other EU policy frameworks. All three strategies served to re-endorse the EU's 
commitment in high-profile and complex areas where the existing instruments were not 
delivering the desired results.40 In the case of Russia and Ukraine these were the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs),41 and cooperation with the Mediterranean had mainly 
been based on the Barcelona declaration.42 Yet, in a probable attempt to stay clear of ex 
Article 47 TEU the CSs did not specify their relation or contribution to these mixed 
agreements. 43 By contrast, the CSs largely mirrored their structure and content without 
clarifying how previous shortcomings would be addressed. This was bound to lead to 
confusion, not only within the EU but also for the EU's partners.  
These contradictory tendencies of drafting CSs at the same time sufficiently precise to 
restrict the room of manoeuvre for lower-level decisions and vague enough to avoid 
encroaching upon the acquis, resulted in documents that were ‘presentationally helpful’44 but 
lacked clear focus. The lengthy enumerations of objectives and activities – resembling 
something between inventories and shopping lists – spanned the EU’s pillars, but did not 
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provide any connections between them or set out a clear allocation of tasks.45For strategies 
worthy of their name, these documents did not sufficiently make clear what the EU wanted to 
achieve with them. It seemed that, rather than the starting point or guide for future actions, 
the stock-tacking of objectives and activities that met with the approval of all Member States 
was the true objective of the CSs exercise.46Koutrakos goes as far as stating that the 
appearance of providing coherence was the actual purpose of the CSs, that mainly sought ‘to 
assuage concerns over the potential undermining implications of the functioning of the 
second pillar alongside the Community legal framework’.47Such inward-looking documents, 
that were moreover the result of an EU-only drafting process, appeared to relegate the 
recipients of EU policies to the background.48Particularly with regard to the Mediterranean 
these EU-imposed objectives therefore risked to smell of neo-colonialism.49 
2.1.2. A SILENT DEMISE 
Already a couple of months after the publication of the last Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean, the demise of this instrument was set in motion when a confidential report by 
High Representative Solana was leaked in January 2001. This remarkably critical note starts 
from the observation that the CSs had so far not contributed to a stronger and more effective 
EU in international affairs. 50 Solana did not shy away from using harsh words and 
summarised the shortcomings as follows:  
‘The existing Common Strategies tend to be too broadly defined in scope to be truly 
effective and to have added value. They are sometimes so thoroughly negotiated among 
the Member States that they do not contain real priorities or posteriorities and have 
become little more than inventories of existing policies and activities.’51 
The report recognises that the Member States' fear for QMV explains their reluctance to fully 
commit and has resulted in a ‘Christmas tree’ approach with long lists of objectives based on 
the lowest common denominator.52The High Representative does however not give up on the 
instrument and demonstrates a commitment to draw lessons and take steps to improve its 
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functioning. Importantly, the report proposes to grant the Commission and the High 
Representative a greater role in defining, implementing and monitoring more focussed 
objectives. These proposals, that were largely upheld by the General Affairs Council of 
February 2001, 53  allow to expand the much-needed institutional support for such 
comprehensive policy frameworks.  
A joint follow-up report of the High Representative and the Commission not only served to 
demonstrate an enhanced institutional backing for this CFSP instrument but also appeared to 
tone down the obsession with QMV. Departing from the realisation that none of the existing 
CSs had led to a single vote by qualified majority, it is stressed that this ‘should not be seen 
as an end in itself, but rather as a way to speed up and facilitate consensus decisions’.54 
Unfortunately, rather than a new start, this report appeared to be a last convulsion of the 
common strategy instrument. The reasonable recommendations were of no avail and the 
CSs still failed to impact on EU policies. Many initiatives towards Russia, Ukraine and the 
Mediterranean arose outside the established frameworks and only a marginal number of joint 
actions and common positions referred to the CSs.55Notably, none of the latter were adopted 
by QMV and Member States remained committed to seeking consensus in CFSP decision-
making. 56  The attention for this policy tool gradually diminished. Each of the CSs was 
extended for one term and then never again.57With regard to Russia the EU's attention 
shifted towards the four 'common spaces' launched in 2003,58 whilst EU policies towards 
Ukraine and the Mediterranean were from 2004 directed by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP).59The announced CS for the Western Balkans,60 where it could arguably have 
provided most added value in view of the absence of a comprehensive EU framework, was 
never adopted. Instead the EU engrafted its approach towards this region entirely on the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) that was enforced by the Council in 
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1999. 61 Furthermore, thematic strategies such as the EU Strategy to combat illicit 
accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)and the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, were enforced as European Council conclusions, rather than being 
adopted on the legal basis that was specifically created for such purposes.62 
All these elements taken together served as a silent confirmation of the common strategies’ 
inglorious demise.63 The Amsterdam Treaty had created an innovative instrument for which 
the EU's constitutional and institutional framework was clearly not ready. In the end, it 
proofed vain hope that a legal instrument would be able to iron out all the difficulties of the 
EU's fragmented external action constellation.  
3. THE UNNOTICED RESURRECTION: ARTICLE 22 OF THE LISBON TEU 
In the light of the unfortunate experience of the common strategies and the fading of both 
policy and academic attention, one could have expected the instrument to be silently 
dropped from the new constitutional framework of the Lisbon Treaty. At first glance this is 
confirmed by the new Article 26 TEU, the formal successor of ex Article 13 TEU, that no 
longer makes any mention of the CSs. The European Council shall still ‘identify the Union’s 
strategic interests’ but seems no longer accorded with a concrete legal instrument to give 
effect to this responsibility. Also Article 25 TEU, that sets out the CFSP's toolbox, does not 
list the CSs or any other instrument of that kind. This creates the impression that strategic 
guidance is taken out of the realm of operational decision-making and reverted back to the 
European Council's declaratory role of defining general guidelines for the CFSP in its 
conclusions. 
Yet, a more profound look at the new TEU indicates that while the name of the common 
strategies may not have survived the Treaty changes, its form clearly has. The provisions 
were simply moved out of the CFSP chapter and added to Article 22 TEU that rebrands the 
instrument – a bit less catchy – as ‘Decisions of the European Council on the strategic 
interests and objectives of the Union’. The rationale of the old CSs, as comprehensive 
strategic frameworks, remains in place and is even taken to a higher level (cf. supra).  
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In order to understand this unexpected twist, the preparatory work of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the changes to the concept will first be analysed in more depth. Second, this contribution will 
focus on the place of Article 22 in the new EU external action architecture in order to explain 
why this refurbished instrument has greater potential than its predecessor. A final part will 
shed some more light on the surprising absence of efforts to exploit this potential.  
3.1. L'HISTOIRE SE REPÈTE? 
The discussions of the Amsterdam IGC on the benefits and disadvantages of extending 
qualified majority voting to the CFSP were largely repeated in the Working Group on External 
Action of the 2001-2003Convention on the Future of Europe, which lay at the basis of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The Group agreed that QMV, as an instrument of last resort, has an important 
role to play in unblocking stalemates and stimulating consensus-building. Opinions diverged 
however on the extent to which this expedient should apply to the CFSP in general or be 
reserved for exceptional circumstances.64Eventually, it could only be agreed to make better 
use of the existing exceptions to the general rule of unanimity. 
By contrast, when turning to the CSs, the emphasis was very different from that at the time of 
its creation. Rather than a compromise mechanism, ‘akin to a form of ceasefire in the 
constitutional politics of the EU’,65 the members of the Group focused on the integrative 
potential of this instrument. Whilst acknowledging that it had not lived up to expectations, 
they commended the CSs as a concrete and operational tool to ensure that all instruments of 
EU external action, regardless of their nature, are used in a manner consistent with that 
strategy.66 Moreover, the idea surfaced to create a new type of joint initiative by the High 
Representative and the Commission aimed at integrating the various elements of EU 
external action. It is clearly out of these reflections that the refurbished common strategies of 
the Lisbon Treaty emerged: 
Article 22 
1. On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council 
shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. 
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union 
shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external 
action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific 
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country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the 
means to be made available by the Union and the Member States. 
The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, 
adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. Decisions of the 
European Council shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in 
the Treaties. 
2. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the 
area of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of 
external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council. 
Rather than a remainder of the previous Treaty framework, Article 22 TEU thus results from 
a purposeful undertaking to breath new life into the old instrument. The absence of any 
reference to the old common strategy provisions indicates a desire to turn a corner a start 
with a clean sheet. Article 22grants the European Council the power to adopt decisions on 
the strategic interests and objectives of the Union that may be geographic or thematic in 
approach. It is moreover made explicit that these decisions shall (not ‘may’) relate to the 
CFSP and to other areas of EU external action. In this light, the transfer of these provisions 
from the CFSP Chapter to the ‘General Provisions on the Union's External Action’ is not a 
mere cosmetic change, but must be seen as a deliberate rectification of the constitutionally 
questionable nature of the former CSs. In a sign that the emphasis of this instrument is now 
undoubtedly on enhancing the coherence of EU external action, the European Council 
decisions are placed from the outset in the context of the unified principles and objectives of 
Article 21 TEU.67 A more symbolic but nonetheless significant change is that instead of 
adopting CSs ‘in areas where the Member States have important interests in common’,68 
these European Council decision now focus on the interests and objectives ‘of the Union’. 
On a procedural level changes were less pervasive. The European Council continues to take 
these decisions unanimously69 on a recommendation from the Council. It is specified that the 
latter adopts such a recommendation under the arrangements laid down for each area. The 
exception to take decisions defining a Union action or position – the new denomination for 
CFSP joint actions and common positions – by QMV remains in place, as does the Member 
States' escape clause.70 Arguably, the restraining potential of the latter has slightly been 
softened. Instead of ‘important’ reasons, Member States now have to state ‘vital’ reasons of 
national policy. Furthermore, rather than simply referring the issue to the European Council 
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for a decision by unanimity, the High Representative is accorded with a mediating task and 
shall first try to seek a solution that is acceptable to all Member States. A final notable 
provision, clearly inspired by the above-mentioned report of the European Convention, is 
Article 22(2) TEU that enables the High Representative, for the CFSP, and the Commission, 
for other areas of external action, to submit joint proposals to the Council. These measures 
are aimed at the implementation of the European Council decisions and ensure the much-
needed institutional support for giving effect to such comprehensive policy measures.71 
3.2. A MORE SOLID CONSTITUTIONAL BEDDING 
The main innovation of Article 22 TEU is the explicit mandate to bridge the legal divide 
between CFSP and other (former EC) external competences. This represents in fact a 
codification of the former practice of the common strategies. Yet, the essence of the reform 
lies not in the article itself but in the new constitutional framework in which it is embedded. 
While there was no basis for cross-pillar action under the previous Treaty framework, such a 
comprehensive approach is entirely in agreement with the streamlined external action 
constellation of the Lisbon Treaty.72 The pillar structure has been abolished by dissolving the 
EC into the Union and the latter is accorded a single legal personality.73 With regard to 
external action these changes are reflected in Article 21 TEU that groups together and 
interlinks all its principles and objectives – that were previously spread across the different 
external competences of the Treaties – under a single heading. Another important innovation 
is the strengthening of the duty, for EU institutions and Member States, to ensure 
consistency between the various EU external policies and the fact that the Court is enabled 
to adjudicate on its application. 74  Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty has created new 
institutional functions with a mandate spanning both CFSP and other external competences, 
namely the High Representative for the CFSP/Vice-President of the Commission, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Union Delegations.75 
These provisions read like a plea to interlink and integrate various external policies and 
objectives. Yet, at the same time the CFSP is still governed by ‘specific rules and 
procedures’ that continue to exclude the bulk of this policy area from the jurisdiction of the 
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EU Court of Justice (ECJ)76and keep the Commission and the European Parliament at arm's 
length from its decision-making process. In addition, the CFSP is excluded from the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) that lists all the other EU (external) competences. In 
this manner the Lisbon Treaty appears to formulate contradictory pleas for integrating and 
delimitating CFSP and TFEU competences that seem difficult to reconcile in practice.  
This integration-delimitation paradox is echoed in Article 40 TEU, the successor of the 
hierarchical delimitation clause of ex Article 47 TEU. This article now states that the 
implementation of CFSP competences shall not affect the procedures and institutional 
balance of TFEU policies and vice versa. On the one hand this mirrors the depillarisation by 
making an end to the explicit subordination of the CFSP and placing it on an equal footing 
with the TFEU. On the other hand, it exemplifies and even strengthens the CFSP-TFEU 
demarcation by according the old provision a Janus face and granting a similar level of 
protection to the CFSP. It is consequently not surprising that Article 40 TEU has generated a 
lot of debate on what it means for the practice of developing EU external policies and 
ensuring coherence between them.77 
Article 22 TEU formulates an interesting answer to this paradox. The European Council 
decisions, that relate to both CFSP and TFEU external competences, can function as 
comprehensive framework documents interlinking the various EU instruments and policies 
targeted at a certain country, region or theme, as mandated by Article 21(3) TEU. The 
established framework can subsequently be implemented by a variety of distinct measures 
‘in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties’.78While these measures are 
linked together by a comprehensive strategy, they can be designed in such a way that they 
do not interfere with each other’s procedural, legal and institutional rules. In this manner 
Article 22 TEU opens a window of opportunity for coping with the decades-old challenge of 
ensuring coherence across the constitutional divide between CFSP and non-CFSP external 
policies.  
This approach of integrating CFSP and TFEU competences in policy design while at the 
same time respecting their delimitation in the implementation phase is perfectly in line with 
the language of Article 40 TEU. The provisions of this article no longer focus on separating 
competences under two Treaties (as was the aim of ex Article 47 TEU), but state – in so 
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many words – that the implementation of CFSP/TFEU policies shall not affect the application 
of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions under the TFEU/CFSP. 
The issue of procedural incompatibility does not arise at the level of the European Council 
decisions, which are adopted unanimously. The right institutional balance can be ensured 
through the Council recommendations, on which the European Council decisions are based, 
that are to be adopted ‘under the arrangements laid down for each area’. Arguably, this 
phase would have benefited from a wider institutional participation, in particular of the 
Commission and the Parliament. The more so since there seems to be nothing in the Treaty 
that would prevent the European Council – as the main motor providing direction to the 
Union 79  – from laying down obligations upon EU institutions acting under the TFEU. 80 
Unfortunately, Article 22 TEU does not shed much light on its relationship to the TFEU. It 
could however be argued that the Commission’s voice is ensured through the High 
Representative/Vice President of the Commission, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. 
Yet, if this wouldn’t provide sufficient guarantees, the only opportunity for the Commission, as 
well as for other institutions, to settle disagreements is to revert to the EU Court of Justice. 
The latter is empowered to review the legality of acts of the European Council intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties ‘on grounds of lack of competence, infringement 
of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law 
relating to their application, or misuse of powers’.81 While Article 24(1) TEU prevents the 
Court from directly reviewing the CFSP elements of such European Council decisions, it 
must on account of Article 40 TEU guarantee that the right balance is struck between CFSP 
and TFEU competences. 
The issue of procedural compatibility does matter in the implementation phase. Here, the 
right of initiative shared by the High Representative and the Commission, set out in Article 
22(2) TEU, provides a solid basis for fine-tuning balanced agreements on the implementation 
of the various EU measures covered by such a strategy document. In case this joint initiative 
would not be able to result in a compromise solution, the accurate choice of legal basis and 
the compliance of these measures with the European Council decisions, the Treaties and in 
particular Article 40 TEU could again – as a measure of last resort – be enforced before the 
Court. 
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Article 22 also provides a possible alternative for dealing with the complexity of combining 
legal bases. In its long-standing case law on this issue the ECJ has attached three main 
conditions to such a combination: (1) the different components of the measure must be 
inseparably linked, (2) neither of them may be incidental to the other and (3) the procedures 
laid down for each legal basis need to be compatible.82 Particularly the last condition has led 
to considerable confusion and it is difficult to distract a coherent line of reasoning from the 
various cases.83 This has made it particularly hard to predict which procedures will found to 
be incompatible by the Court. The ECOWAS case provided the first and only pre-Lisbon 
instance where this issue arose in the context of the delimitation between EC (development 
cooperation) and CFSP competences. Here, the ECJ did not touch upon the question of 
procedural compatibility but simply ruled that a dual legal basis was prohibited in principle 
under ex Article 47 TEU.84Disregarding the merits of this controversial case,85 the general 
prohibition of cross-pillar legal bases had – compared to the confusing case law on 
procedural compatibility – the advantage of legal clarity and predictability. 
The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and particularly the new provisions of Article 40 TEU 
evidently raise the question as to whether this approach is still valid today.86 In case C-
130/10 on the legal basis for restrictive measures – so far the only opportunity to shed more 
light on this issue – the Court begged the question of interpreting Article 40 TEU and hinted 
that a combination of a CFSP and TFEU legal basis for internal EU measures would lead to 
procedural incompatibility.87 Another chance to settle the dust may surface in the pending 
case C-658/11.88 Yet, even if a way could be found to deal with the procedural differences, 
the question remains what a CFSP-TFEU legal basis would imply for the institutional balance 
and how it could be reconciled with the explicit distinctiveness of the CFSP. More precisely it 
is unclear how the exclusion of the ECJ's jurisdiction over the latter could be ensured and 
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what would happen with the ambiguous application of (former EC) principles such as primacy 
and direct effect.89 
By aiming to enhance the coherence of EU external action, the Lisbon Treaty has clearly 
also complicated efforts to respect its strictly-guarded delimitation of competences. In the 
light of the intricacy of combining legal bases, Article 22 TEU provides an interesting tool to 
establish a firm link between CFSP and TFEU competences while at the same time 
respecting the delimitation between them as expressed in Article 40 TEU. 
3.3. THE UNEXPLOITED POTENTIAL 
Well-known documents as the European Security Strategy90 as well as more specific ones 
like the EU Strategy on the adaption to Climate Change 91  illustrate that the need for 
comprehensive strategic frameworks did not end with the demise of the CS instrument. In 
this respect it is surprising that the resurrection of the old instrument did not arouse the least 
attention. Despite its interesting potential the use of Article 22 TEU has – nearly four years 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – not yet been considered in practice.92 
This disregard is particularly remarkable in the debate on the EU's strategic partnerships that 
has been taken to the highest institutional level by European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy. The September 2010 European Council Conclusions stress that bringing ‘Europe's 
true weight to bear internationally […] requires a clear identification of its strategic interests 
and objectives’, but do not consider the legal instrument that was specifically designed for 
this purpose.93Whilst strategic partnerships are – as their name indicates – reciprocal in 
nature and can thus not be based on Article 22 TEU, that is aimed at setting out internally-
agreed EU strategies, both could go hand in hand. The European Council decisions could 
set out the EU's approach towards the objectives of and those it wants to achieve with the 
respective strategic partnerships. 
Yet, also strictly unilateral strategic documents such as the recent and noteworthy EU 
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, the Strategic Framework for the Horn of 
Africa and the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy were not based on 
Article 22 TEU.94Rather they were endorsed by the Council. Adopting them as European 
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Council decisions on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union would not only have 
given them more political weight, but also a concrete and binding legal status. Yet, it could 
well be that it were precisely these characteristics that refrained the Member States from 
having recourse to Article 22 TEU. Moreover, the fear for being outvoted in implementing 
decisions based on QMV plausibly still applies. This risks to lead either to a revival of the 
Christmas-tree approach or to no decisions being taken at all. This fear plays much less for 
other QMV exceptions in the CFSP, such as adopting decisions implementing a decision 
defining a Union action or position, 95  given that they do not have the same aim of 
comprehensiveness. Their much narrower scope limits the room of manoeuvre for 
implementing decisions by QMV.  
In this sense, addressing the Union's strategic interests and objectives through Council 
conclusions offers more hope for transcending the lowest common denominator. Another 
important advantage of this approach is that it allows more flexibility to respond to changing 
needs and circumstances in both the EU and abroad. Then again, Article 22 TEU offers a 
more solid framework for encapsulating unanimously agreed guidelines, instructions and a 
division of labour between and among Member States and EU institutions. This can be of 
particular importance in areas where competence boundaries are fuzzy and duplication and 
fragmentation abound, such as EU crisis management or security sector reform.96 
There are thus a number of advantages and disadvantages connected to the use of Article 
22 TEU that will have to be weighed against each other. This points to a general observation 
with regard to EU Treaty reform: constitutional reorganisation can aim to remove existing 
obstacles to effective and coherent action, but the eventual decisions will continue to depend 
on political considerations. While Article 22 TEU is theoretically a useful innovation in line 
with the constitutional reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, its disuse in practice suggests that it may 
not provide a response to any pressing political needs. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The lifespan of the common strategies was an unsuccessful but instructive experience. 
Paradoxically, the cross-pillar dimension and the introduction of QMV are what constituted its 
potential strengths as well as the weaknesses leading to its demise. On the one hand, the 
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possibility of voting on implementing joint actions and common positions in the Council by 
qualified majority had a restraining rather than a facilitating effect. On the other hand, the 
common strategies ran up to the competence boundaries they were meant to transcend. 
Soon after its creation the instrument consequently slinked off the political scene. 
Rather unnoticeably the Lisbon Treaty revitalises this instrument in the form of Article 22 
TEU that sets out the European Council decisions on the strategic interests and objectives of 
the Union. This at first sight counterintuitive move represents a determined effort to tackle the 
shortcomings of its predecessor and thus grant it a more promising future. In particular, the 
Lisbon Treaty provides a more solid legal bedding for comprehensive EU action. These 
European Council decisions embody the two main characterizing Treaty articles of the EU’s 
reformed external action system. First, in the spirit of Article 21 TEU, they can function as 
policy umbrellas grouping together the various EU objectives, principles, competences, 
instruments and actors with relevance to a certain country, region or theme. Second, in the 
implementation phase this comprehensive approach can then be broken up in various 
separate measures that serve a shared objective. Importantly, these measures respect the 
EU's division of competences and in particular the painstakingly guarded CFSP-TFEU 
delimitation as set out in Article 40 TEU. 
This potential has however not yet been turned into reality and instead the Union's strategic 
interests and objectives are still set out in Council conclusions. This approach has the 
advantage of being less stringent and allows more flexibility in the fluctuating field of external 
relations. A continuous cost-benefit analysis among EU Member States will therefore 
determine whether Article 22 TEU will eventually be put in practice or become a ghost clause 
that gradually disappears between the lines of the Lisbon Treaty. In theory, the article thus 
represents a good example of innovative constitutional design, but it may also be questioned 
whether it is not too far removed from political reality.  
